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Abstract: This paper uses a hybrid human capital / signaling model to study
grading standards in schools when tuition fees are allowed. The paper analyzes the
grading standard set by a proﬁt maximizing school and compares it with the eﬃcient
one. The paper also studies grading standards when tuition fees have limits. When
fees are regulated a proﬁt maximizing school will set lower grading standards than
when they are not regulated. Credit constraints of families also induce schools
to lower their standards. Given that in the model presented competition is not
feasible, these results show the importance of regulation of grading standards.
1 Introduction
In many countries there is an ongoing debate about the need to reform
regulatory frameworks for education. The two main issues discussed are
ﬁnancing problems and the need to increase students’ achievement levels.
The economics literature and policy makers recognize that these two issues
are related. The usual argument depends on the eﬀect of the pool of stu-
dents (through the peer group eﬀect) and of school resources on quality of
education. The importance of the peer group eﬀect has led to the idea that
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1careful consideration of rationing mechanisms that aﬀect the mix of stu-
dents at school (like tuition fees, scholarships, vouchers or the introduction
of charter and magnet schools) may improve quality of education (Nechyba,
2006). The objective of this paper is to analyze another important poten-
tial channel that links quality of education and the way school systems are
ﬁnanced (publicly, through the market or through the market with regula-
tory constraints). This channel emphasizes the relation between willingness
to pay for education and the grading standards. This channel brings new
policy recommendations and aﬀects the way empirical results about quality
of education are interpreted.
The main question addressed in this paper is about the relation between
the grading standards used by schools and the way schools are ﬁnanced. I
point to a particular relation between the value individuals give to degrees
and their willingness to pay for attending school. Grading standards have
a very important role in determining quality of education since they can
be used to inﬂuence students’ achievement (see Betts and Grogger, 2003;
Figlio and Lucas, 2004). However, since individuals usually diﬀer in their
ability (and consequently in the eﬀort they must make to achieve a particular
grading standard), the value attached to the grading standard varies in very
important ways with ability. Consequently, the value individuals give to
education also varies with ability linking willingness to pay for education
and the grading standard and aﬀecting the way schools set their grading
standards.
A discussion of these issues must consider the relation between students
and schools or teachers, and also the characteristics of the labor market. On
the one hand, students and schools are the main players in the education
market; tuition fees and grading standards may have important incentive
eﬀects on both types of players which makes it important to have a model
where both are present. On the other hand, if one wants to have a mean-
ingful role for degrees one should consider a model where degrees have real
and important consequences for students. For this reason I use the human
capital / signaling hybrid model introduced by Betts (1998).1 This implies
that the best model to think about education is one that accounts for both
phenomena. Individual productivity depends on individual ability and ef-
fort at school but ﬁrms do not observe individual productivity which makes
1. The evidence on whether the eﬀects of investment in education in the labor market are
best described by a human capital or a signaling model is mixed (see Kroch and Sjoblom,
1994; Lang and Kropp, 1986; Riley, 1979; Wolpin, 1977). This justiﬁes the use of a model
that accounts for both phenomena.
2degrees important signaling devices. Individuals maximize utility and eﬀort
is costly for them. Schools maximize proﬁts and education is a costly task.2
There is a wide existing literature concerned with education, however
there is not much on the issue of how grading standards are chosen by
teachers or school mangers. The main related papers are De Fraja and
Landeras (2006) and Brunello and Rocco (2008).3 De Fraja and Landeras
(2006) use a diﬀerent model where grading results from an ad-hoc func-
tion and not from assumptions about the value of degrees to students and
they concentrate on numerical results. Brunello and Rocco (2008) is much
more related to the present paper; they use a very similar model and also
ask for similar questions. However, they loose generality assuming speciﬁc
functional forms instead of general functions which does not allow them to
analyze the forces involved in the grading standard / tuition decision. More
important, I also address how restrictions on tuition fees chosen by schools
aﬀect grading standards which is important given that in most countries
these restrictions are present. Other related contributions are Betts (1998)
and Costrell (1994) who dwell with the determinants of eﬃcient grading
standards and of the grading standards that result when set by majority
voting. They do not consider the relation between grading standards and
tuition fees and do not address the problem of how grading standards are
2. Whether schools are accurately described as proﬁt maximizing institutions is an unre-
solved issue. Clearly the distinction between non-proﬁt and for-proﬁt based on whether
there is a third party (shareholders) that claims economic beneﬁts is not enough. Educa-
tional institutions can be managed by administrators or teachers that want resources for
activities in their interests (v.g. low teaching or administrative loads, nice buildings or
research in the case of universities.). My choice of objective function answers to the fact
that whatever the objective schools have, if schools face resource constraints they may
want to maximize proﬁts obtained from tuition fees. Probably my speciﬁcation will not
accurately match reality in quantitative terms, but still it shows important mechanisms
that emerge when schools are subject to budget pressures. Epple and Romano (1998) and
Epple, Romano and Siege (2003) are two good examples of this point; the models used
in both papers are very similar, the main diﬀerence is that in the ﬁrst schools are proﬁt
maximizers and in the second they maximize quality. Still, they both yield very similar
qualitative conclusions about the behavior of schools and the market outcome.
3. Although not directly concerned with education, Lizzeri (1999) is also related. He
analyzes a diﬀerent setting, namely that of certiﬁcation agencies. He studies the optimal
strategy of a certiﬁcation agency that has some information about the quality of a good
and can choose whether to disclose it to a potential buyer. The main diﬀerence between my
paper and Lizzeri’s is that he considers a pure adverse selection model while the problem
of education posed in my paper requires a model with adverse selection and moral hazard.
3chosen by schools.4
The baseline argument in this paper is that the choice of grading stan-
dard by a proﬁt concerned school is aﬀected in very important ways by the
rules aﬀecting tuition fees. The eﬃcient grading standard is such that the
marginal student (the lowest ability student achieving the degree) would
beneﬁt from a reduction in the standard. In the eﬃcient allocation, the gov-
ernment trades oﬀ the sum of eﬀort disutility of all students and beneﬁts in
terms of increasing overall labor market productivity. Being unable to tailor
the standard to the ability of students individually, the government must
set a grading standard such that low-ability (high-ability) students achiev-
ing the degree would beneﬁt from a reduction (increase) of the standard.
However, the proﬁt maximizing school will tailor the grading standard to
maximize the willingness to pay of the marginal student so as to maximize
the tuition fee that can be extracted from students.
If the school chooses the tuition fee together with the grading standard,
for a given marginal student, the eﬃcient standard would be higher than
the one set by the proﬁt maximizing school; a grading standard which is
lower than the eﬃcient one allows the school to charge higher tuition fees.
If the school is not free to choose the tuition fee charged to students and
faces a cap (because of regulation or because of families’ credit constraints)
the school would reduce the grading standard since that will allow them to
increase proﬁts through a higher demand for school enrollment. When the
school receives a payment per student from the government, willingness to
pay for tuition is disconnected from its quality; if a lower standard is related
to higher demand5 the grading standard will be ineﬃciently low.
An additional and important result is related to the comparison of the
eﬃcient grading standard with that set by the proﬁt maximizer school when
there is a cap on tuition fee. I show in this paper that the eﬃcient grading
standard increases with the cap on the fee while the decentralized standard
decreases with the cap. Since in most countries tuition fees are regulated
(if allowed at all), this result shows the importance of regulating grading
standards and that this importance grows when limits on tuition fees are
lower. These results shed light on the optimal instruments that must be
used to regulate schools. The main lesson is that regulating tuition fees will
lower grading standards. To avoid this eﬀect, regulation of schools must also
4. Also related is Gary-Bobo and Tranoy (2005) but the paper concentrates on admission
standards instead of graduation standards.
5. I will show conditions such that this holds
4include instruments to directly or indirectly control the grading standard
used by the school. Instruments like the baccalaureat in France or national
state exams in many other countries can be very useful to incentivize schools
by linking students’ results to the economic received by schools or teachers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions of
the model, describes individuals’ behavior and the labor market outcome.
Section 3 analyzes the (second-best) eﬃcient outcome. The main results
of the paper are analyzed in Section 4 where the problem of the proﬁt
maximizing school is solved and compared with the eﬃcient outcome. The
last section concludes.
2 The model
This section describes the main assumptions of the model, the behavior of
individuals and the labor market equilibrium.
2.1 Assumptions
Assume a continuum of individuals indexed by i. Each individual has a
utility function
ui = wi − t − v(ei)
and a labor market productivity ω(φi,ei). Wages are represented by wi,
t represents the payment for tuition by students, ei her eﬀort at school
and φi her ability. v and ω are strictly increasing in all arguments. ω is
concave in both arguments and satisﬁes ωφe ≥ 0. v is convex. Ability is
exogenously given, it is distributed with a cumulative distribution function
F with support [φL,φH].6
For simplicity I assume that there is only one school whose only task is
to provide degrees. This assumption allows the study of the eﬀect of proﬁt
maximization on grading standards; settings in which there are more schools
are left for future research. The objective function of the school is given by
Π = π[t − γ]
6. The dependence of labor market productivity on ability has been widely recognized by
the empirical literature; evidence for the dependence on eﬀort at school is more scarce,
recently Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) show evidence that support this assump-
tion.
5where π is the number of students who attend the school and γ the marginal
cost of serving one student. The school has a technology (an exam) that
allows it to determine whether the productivity of a student is above or
below a certain threshold ω. The school will award a degree to a student if
her productivity is above that threshold. Let
Di =

d if ω(φi,ei) ≥ ω
f otherwise
represent whether the student i achieves the degree or not.
The labor market is imperfect. Firms do not observe individual pro-
ductivity, they only observe whether the individual achieved a degree or
not. Consequently wages can only be conditioned on Di. The wage of an
individual i is given by
wi = E[ω(φi,ei)|Di]. (1)
As will be clear later no individual would attend school and not achieve the
degree. Consequently, there will be only two wage levels observed in the
labor market one for individuals that achieved the degree, wd, and one for
those that did not attend school, wu.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage the school chooses
ω and t. In the second stage individuals decide whether to attend school
and the eﬀort they will make. In the third stage individuals go to the labor
market and earn wages according to equation (1).
2.2 The behavior of individuals
The behavior of individuals is characterized by two properties. The ﬁrst
says that individuals make the minimum eﬀort needed. The second shows
the monotonicity property for the decision of whether to achieve a degree
or not. The appendix provides proofs for both properties.
Minimal eﬀort. Let εi = max{ei,0} where ω(φi,ei) = ω. The optimal
eﬀort of a type-i student is εi.
This property says that the optimal eﬀort of an individual who ﬁnds
it suboptimal to achieve the degree is equal to zero. Among individuals
who decide to attend school, eﬀort will decrease with ability and will equal
zero for those with very high ability. Those students who exert an eﬀort
level greater than zero will end up with a productivity equal to the grading
6standard; the productivity of those who do not exert eﬀort but achieve the
degree will be greater than the grading standard.7 Note that εi is a function
of φi and ω; to spare notation I will omit the arguments of εi in this paper.
Monotonicity. If a student with ability φi chooses (not) to achieve the
degree, all students with ability φh ≥ (≤)φi will (not) choose to achieve the
degree.
From the monotonicity property and the continuity of the support of φi,
there is a marginal student who is indiﬀerent between achieving the degree
and not achieving it. Let the ability of this student be represented by e φ.
2.3 Wages and comparative statics
In section 2.1 I argued that only two wages are observed in the labor market.
Using the two properties discussed in the previous subsection wages can be
written as follows:
wd(e φ,ω) = E[ω(φi,εi)|φi ≥ e φ] = ω
F(Φ) − F(e φ)






1 − F(e φ)
,






where Φ represents the ability level at which there is no need to exert eﬀort







as the willingness to pay for attending school and achieving the degree for
an individual of ability φi if she is the marginal individual. Then, in equi-
librium, e φ must satisfy
∆(e φ,ω) − t = 0. (3)
Equation (3) deﬁnes implicitly the ability of the marginal individual as a
function of ω and t. Let this function be e φ(ω,t). The comparative statics








7. Given that we have a continuum of abilities, there is a mass zero of individuals that
exert zero eﬀort and have a productivity equal to the grading standard
7which follow from the diﬀerentiation of (3). In the previous expressions and
in the rest of the paper, subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives.
From inspection of the expressions for ∆ω and ∆φ, provided in the ap-
pendix we can show that if ∆φ(e φ,ω) > 0, then










The condition that ∆φ > 0 is intuitive: the better the pool of students
achieving the degree, the larger their surplus. Moreover it has intuitive
implications. The ﬁrst implication is that increasing the tuition will reduce
demand for school; this implication needs little explanation.
The second implication is that increasing the grading standard will in-
crease the ability of the marginal student if it also reduces the value of
achieving the degree (for a given marginal individual). To understand this
comparative static, it is very important to note that increasing the standard
has the beneﬁt of increasing the diﬀerential between wd and wu but it also
increases the eﬀort cost of achieving the degree. The sign of ∆ω depends on
the value of the grading standard itself and can be positive or negative. To
see this write
∆ω(e φ,ω) =
F(Φ) − F(e φ)
1 − F(e φ)
−
v0(e ε)
ωe(e φ, e ε)
(5)
which is the marginal utility of ω for the marginal individual. Note that the
ﬁrst term on the right hand side is less than one but the second term can
be larger or smaller than one depending on the value of e ε. In particular,
if the standard induces an e ε which is greater than the optimal eﬀort level
under perfect information conditions8 then ∆ω(e φ,ω) < 0. For lesser eﬀort
levels, there is a region for which ∆ω(e φ,ω) < 0 (for ω inducing high eﬀort
values for which v0(εi)/ωe(φi,εi) is still lower than 1) and a region for which
∆ω(e φ,ω) > 0 (for ω inducing lower eﬀort values).
Even if it is intuitive to think that ∆φ(e φ,ω) > 0 the sign of ∆φ(e φ,ω)
still remains ambiguous.9 For the time being I will suppose that this is true;
further in this paper I will show that, with a proﬁt maximizing school, in
equilibrium only this can be the case.10
8. This is the eﬀort that solves ωe(e φ,e) = v
0(e).
9. Assuming t = 0 Betts (1998) shows that ∆φ(e φ,ω) > 0 holds in stable equilibria. The
result holds also for diﬀerent values of t if it is exogenous.
10. See equation (12) and the corresponding explanation in page 4.1.
83 The eﬃcient tuition fee and grading standard
I turn now to the analysis of the eﬃcient outcome of this model. I will
analyze the case where the planner maximizes the sum of individual utilities
constrained by the same restrictions on information faced by the school: it
can only observe whether individual productivity is above or below ω. The
problem solved in this section is very similar to that solved by Betts (1998)
with the diﬀerence that I introduce tuition fees. The introduction of the
tuition fee allows to show its interplay with the grading standard.
The government plays in the ﬁrst stage of the game anticipating indi-
viduals’ behavior. The problem of the government is given by
max
ω,t
[1 − F(e φ)]wd(e φ,ω) + F(e φ)wu(e φ) −
Z Φ
e φ
v(εi)dF(φi) − [1 − F(e φ)]γ
where, to spare notation, I have drop the arguments of e φ(ω,t). Note that as a
consequence of the utilitarianism and quasiconcavity of utility assumptions,
the government is indiﬀerent about the distribution of utility between indi-
viduals and the distribution of surplus between individuals and the school.
This means that the government does not directly care about tuition fees,
except as an instrument to control e φ.
After some manipulations (using 3) the ﬁrst-order conditions of the wel-
fare maximization problem (provided in the appendix) yield
t∗ = γ |{z}
1
+ [wd − wu]
| {z }
2










where ω∗ and t∗ represent the eﬃcient grading standard and tuition fee.
Equations (6) and (7) describe the welfare maximizing tuition fee and
grading standard. These equations show that in the optimum there is a
separation between the two objectives of the government, namely sorting
(which individuals should achieve the degree) and inducing optimal eﬀort
levels. The tuition fee is used to achieve the optimal number of individuals
achieving the degree, the grading standard is used to give students incentives
for eﬀort. The optimal tuition fee is greater than the marginal cost11 and
11. This follows from ω < w
d and ω(e φ,0) > w
u.
9is composed of three terms. The ﬁrst term is the marginal cost, the second
term equals the individual gain from attending school and the third term the
social gain of letting an individual with ability e φ attend school. The second
and third terms explain why the optimal tuition fee must be higher than the
marginal cost. The second term is a Pigouvian term: the optimal tuition
fee extracts the externality an individual receives from achieving the degree.
This externality results from the information problems in the labor market.
However, the government cannot completely extract this externality without
hampering the beneﬁts to exert eﬀort, the third term rewards eﬀort.
The main feature of the equation governing the grading standard is that
it is set to equate its marginal cost and beneﬁt. The marginal beneﬁt of
increasing the standard is given by the mass of students who would increase
their eﬀort and would have a higher productivity. The marginal cost is equal
to the sum of the marginal disutilities of eﬀort of all students.
Suppose now that there is some external limit on the tuition fee. This
limit can be given by credit constraints faced by individuals or by political
constraints that limit the power of the government to charge tuition fees.
Letting τ denote the upper bound on the tuition fee and ωτ denote the
resulting optimal grading standard, the ﬁrst order condition for the grading
standard (when t∗ > τ) takes the form:












where, to simplify notation, I have replaced e φ(ωτ,τ) by e φτ. In this ex-
pression a new term appears and has the same interpretation as the terms
appearing in the optimal eﬃcient fee. If there are restrictions that limit the
power of the fee to solve the sorting issue it is optimal to amend the grading
standard for this purpose. As before we have a Pigouvian and an incen-
tives term. Since the second term in the right hand side of (8) is negative,
by concavity, the grading standard will be higher when there are limits on
the tuition fee than in the absence of these limits. If the grading standard
is not amended for this purpose there would be too many low ability stu-
dents achieving the degree; the grading standard is increased to avoid this
to happen.
Expression (8) is similar to that determining the eﬃcient grading stan-
dard in Betts (1998), but it is slightly more general since it accounts for
10tuition fees that are diﬀerent from zero. To get the expression that deter-
mines the grading standard when tuition fees are simply not possible it is
enough to set τ = 0.
An important implication of equations (7) and (8) that will be used
further in this paper is that in both cases considered in this section, the
eﬀort of the marginal individual satisﬁes12
F(Φ) − F(e φ)
1 − F(e φ)
<
v0(e ε)
ωe(e φ, e ε)
. (9)
From the expression for ∆ω (see section A.3 in the appendix) it follows that
∆ω < 0, or that the marginal student would beneﬁt from a reduction in the
grading standard (her utility would be higher if the standard is marginally
reduced). This also implies that in the eﬃcient solution e φω > 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Information asymmetries place
the eﬃcient policies in a second-best situation. In this second best situation
the eﬃcient grading standard will be tailored to average utility. Setting a
grading standard which is optimal from the point of view of the marginal
individual would have the cost of inducing too little eﬀort by individuals
with abilities φi ≥ ˜ φ. Inducing greater eﬀort by those individuals implies
setting a grading standard that requires an eﬀort by the marginal individual
which is above her optimal eﬀort.
4 Optimal tuition fee and grading standard for a
proﬁt maximizing school
In this section I consider two situations. First, the problem of a monopolist
school that decides upon t and ω. Then I consider the situation when the
monopolist is not able to charge a tuition fee but receives a payment per
student from the government. The main objective is to compare the grad-
ing standard set by the proﬁt maximizing school with the eﬃcient grading
standard.













ωe(e φ, e ε)
dF(φ
i) = (1 − F(e φ))
v
0(e ε)
ωe(e φ, e ε)
.
Where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the facts that ε






i) is increasing in ε
i.
114.1 First order conditions
From the monotonicity property of individual behavior we can write the
school’s objective function as [1−F(e φ)][t−γ]. The problem of the school is to
maximize proﬁts subject to optimality of individuals’ choices in subsequent
periods; this means that e φ satisﬁes (3). The problem of the school is thus
max
ω,t
[1 − F(e φ(ω,t))][t − γ].
Letting ωπ and tπ represent the grading standard and tuition that solve this
problem, the ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior optimum of this problem
are
−f(e φ(ωπ,tπ))e φt(ωπ,tπ)[tπ − γ] + [1 − F(e φ(ωπ,tπ))] = 0, (10)
−f(e φ(ωπ,tπ))e φωπ(ωπ,tπ)[tπ − γ] = 0. (11)
The optimal tuition fee follows from the two previous equations. Rear-
ranging (10) it follows that
tπ = γ +
1 − F(e φ(ωπ,tπ))
f(e φ(ωπ,tπ))e φt(ωπ,tπ)
. (12)
This expression proves that with a proﬁt maximizing school and no govern-
ment intervention only equilibria where ˆ φt > 0 (and thus where ∆φ > 0) will
emerge in this model. Equilibria where ˆ φt < 0 result in t < γ and the school
would make negative proﬁts so no proﬁt maximizing school would operate.
From the ﬁrst order condition for ω:
e φω(ωπ,tπ) = 0
which implies
∆ω(e φ(ωπ,tπ),ωπ,tπ) =
F(Φ) − F(e φ(ωπ,tπ))
1 − F(e φ(ωπ,tπ))
−
v0(e ε)
ωe(e φ(ωπ,tπ), e ε)
= 0. (13)
This equation says that the proﬁt maximizing school sets the standard in
order to induce the marginal student to exert the eﬀort that is optimal from
her point of view. This results from the fact that the school assigns no
intrinsic value to the grading standard; it only values the grading standard
if it directly aﬀects willingness to pay for attending school. Consequently,
it sets the grading standard to maximize the willingness to pay for tuition
by the marginal student.
124.2 Implications
Comparison of (7) and (13) shows the ineﬃciency of the grading standard
set by the proﬁt concerned school. The source of the ineﬃciency is that the
proﬁt maximizing school cares only for the welfare of the marginal individ-
ual, while in the eﬃcient solution, eﬀort disutility of all students is taken
into account.
In general it is not possible to unambiguously compare the tuition fees
and gradings standards of both outcomes. However, some interesting partial
comparisons can be made. First consider the grading standard conditional
on a given tuition fee. Equation (9) shows that, in the eﬃcient solution, the
marginal student would receive higher utility if the standard was reduced.
This means that, ﬁxing the tuition fee to the eﬃcient value, the proﬁt max-
imizing school could make a marginal reduction in the standard increasing
demand and proﬁts. This means that given a tuition fee equal to the eﬃ-
cient one, the proﬁt maximizing school would set an ineﬃciently low grading
standard.
Second, consider a situation where the marginal student is ﬁxed at the
eﬃcient level, i.e. e φ is given by equation (7). In this case, the for-proﬁt
school sets a higher tuition fee than the welfare maximizing solution and a
lower grading standard. This follows from equation (9), which says that the
eﬃcient marginal student would want a lower standard; if the standard is
reduced she would be willing to pay a higher fee for attending school. The
school would get higher proﬁts in this new situation. A consequence of this
is that the eﬀort induced by a proﬁt maximizing school will be lower than
the eﬃcient one.
To summarize, marginally, the proﬁt maximizing school sets a lower
grading standard and a higher tuition fee than the those which are eﬃcient.
These comparisons are very useful to think about how schools that face bud-
getary pressures will respond to policies but do not allow us to say whether
the observed tuition fee and grading standard of the proﬁt maximizing school
are higher or lower than the eﬃcient ones.
Given the institutional settings in which schools normally operate it
makes sense to consider the eﬀect of tuition fees limits. There are several
cases that can be considered and are the same already considered in Section
3. First, the absolute absence of tuition fees together with external ﬁnancing
of schools. Second, one can also consider limits on tuition fees that are due
either to regulatory constraints or to credit constraints faced by families.
13Consider the case in which the school is not allowed to charge tuition
fees and receives the resources to ﬁnance its operation from external sources
(typically from the government). Suppose that the school receives a per
student payment t ≥ γ. Under these conditions the school will set a grad-
ing standard that induces all students to attend the school and achieve the
degree. This follows from equations (4) and (5) and Lemma 1 in the ap-
pendix, which show that when students do not make payments to school it
will always be that e φω > 0; this means that a reduction in the standard will
always reduce the ability of the marginal student. Since t is ﬁxed, the school
will always want to reduce the standard to increase demand since that will
always increase proﬁts. If students do not have to pay to attend school,
the only reason not to attend would be if the standard is to high; however,
the school would not want to set a high standard since there is no relation
between the level of the standard and the tuition fee students are willing to
pay.
Now suppose that tuition fees are allowed but there is a cap on them.
Assume also that the school is inducing some students to stay out of school.
The important question now is whether the grading standard is higher or
lower than ωπ. To ﬁnd the answer consider what happens if the school
sets the standard at the level which maximizes proﬁts if there were no con-
straints on the fee (i.e. it lets ωπ be the standard) and lets the fee equal the
maximum allowed value. At this point, the individual who was marginal in
the unrestricted solution has strictly positive surplus from attending school.
By continuity, there are some students with lower ability willing to attend
school. The new marginal student will be one with lower ability. But ωπ
cannot maximizes proﬁts. If the grading standard that maximizes the will-
ingness to pay for attending school is decreasing in ability13 the grading
standard will be lower than in the absence of constraints on t since that
will raise demand further. Thus, it turns out that the grading standard
would be lower than the one that results when there are no limits on the
fee. Moreover, the same type of argument shows that the lower the limit
the lower the standard.
Two important implications follow from the previous analysis. First,
note the diﬀerences in how the eﬃcient and the proﬁt maximizing grading
standard reacts to tuition fee limits. While the ﬁrst increases with the cap
on tuition the second decreases. Thus the lower the cap the more important
13. In the section A.6 of the appendix I show that the most preferred grading standard
of an individual is increasing in her ability if ω is concave in φ, ωφe ≥ 0 and the hazard
rate is increasing.
14it is to introduce instruments to regulate grading standards. Second, we
have the question of the eﬀect of a regulation that forces schools to set a
tuition fee that equals the eﬃcient one, in this case the school would set an
ineﬃciently low grading standard.
A similar argument can be made to show that if there are credit con-
straints and student’s capacity to pay is limited by family resources, the
grading standard will be lower than in the absence of credit constraints.
This means that one can expect policies that relax credit constraints to
have the eﬀect of increasing grading standards.
5 Concluding comments
In this paper I have addressed the relation between ﬁnancing of school at-
tendance and the grading standards used by institutions that face budget
pressures. The model I used takes into account students’ ability and eﬀort
as the crucial determinants of school achievement. To have a meaningful
role for grading standards I assumed imperfections in the labor market that
set limits on wages.
The main contribution of the paper is that it identiﬁes the sources of
ineﬃciencies implied by budget pressures in the grading standards set by
school managers or by teachers. Under information asymmetries in the la-
bor market, the wage of individuals that achieved the degree is equal to
average marginal productivity of all individuals who achieved the degree.
This implies that the eﬃcient grading standard is set according to average
utility. Individuals, however, due to diﬀerences in the costs they must as-
sume to achieve the degree, have diﬀerent willingness to pay for attending
school. Proﬁt maximizing schools do not care about all the students that at-
tend school, they only care about the marginal student since the maximum
tuition that can be extracted depends on her willingness to pay for educa-
tion. For-proﬁt schools are concerned only with the utility of the marginal
individual and this causes ineﬃcient grading standards.
Ideally the results of this paper should be used to understand the avail-
able empirical results on grading standards used by schools. Probably the
most urgent task is understanding the results regarding the diﬀerence in
achievement in private and public schools. If one believes that the outcome
of having a public school is correctly described by that from section 3 where
the eﬃcient grading standard was studies the comparison with the private
15school is ambiguous. However one can also think that the main diﬀerence
between public and private schools is the ability of the former to charge
tuition fees while the second will be ﬁnanced with public resources. In such
a case my model predicts that public schools will set lower standards than
private schools.14 The model then predicts that students of public schools
have lower results in achievement tests than students of private schools.
However, as argued by Hanushek (2002) the empirical literature is not con-
clusive about the diﬀerence in achievement between students from private
and public schools. One of the main diﬃculties in the literature is that it
has not linked the institutional features of education markets and the reg-
ulatory constraints to the problem. The results in this paper do suggest
avenues of research for the empirical literature, particularly, considering the
link between grading standards and tuition limits (due to regulation or credit
constraints) may help ﬁnding conclusive answers to the problem.
The main message of the paper is that the design of education ﬁnance
schemes must take into account interactions with the grading standards
used by schools. If school managers or teachers are not concerned with
grading standards per se, or if budget pressures are strong relative to other
possible objectives of the school, restricting the power of schools to charge
tuition fees may result in ineﬃciently low grading standards. Policies that
introduce school ﬁnance schemes other than tuition fees should also consider
the impact they may have on grading standards used by schools.
In this paper I have assumed a single school which may be an accurate
description of reality in many cases due to transportation costs or spacial is-
sues related to education demand. However, the eﬀect of competition cannot
be neglected. It must, however, be clear that the main mechanism present in
the paper is independent of the monopoly assumption. Perfect competition
is not an alternative in a setting like the one in this paper; once there is
some degree of monopolistic power the problem of budget pressures causing
schools to over look the willingness to pay of the marginal student would
generate the same type of ineﬃciencies as in the cases considered in this
paper.15 Competition may have important implications on the education
market outcome in more complicated cases in which heterogeneity in other
14. Brunello and Rocco (2008) take a diﬀerent approach and suppose that grading stan-
dards in public schools are chosen by majority voting. They show that standards of public
schools may be higher than those of private schools. This already supposes that grading
standards are not disconnected from tuition fees and is in the way of supposing a regulated
school.
15. A similar point is made by Spence (1975) in a diﬀerent setting.
16dimensions (like wealth) are considered or under less restrictive speciﬁca-
tions of preferences of schools.
17A Appendix
A.1 Proof of the Minimal eﬀort property
Suppose an individual wants to achieve the degree and decides to exert an
eﬀort level e0i > εi; let u0i and uεi be, respectively, the utility levels from
exerting e0i and εi. This would mean that u0i > uεi. Since wage cannot be
conditioned on eﬀort this implies v(e0i) < v(εi) which is clearly a contradic-
tion. An individual that decides not to achieve the degree faces a similar
problem that leads to zero eﬀort.
A.2 Proof of the Monotonicity property
Consider two individuals with ability levels φ0 and φ00 and let their minimal
eﬀorts needed to achieve the degree be ε0 and ε00, respectively. Suppose
that the individual with ability φ0 wants to achieve the degree, then wd −
t − v(ε0) ≥ wu. If φ00 ≥ φ0, wd − t − v(ε00) ≥ wu since v(ε0) ≥ v(ε00).
Similarly if the individual with ability φ0 does not want to achieve the degree,
wd − t − v(ε0) ≤ wu and if φ00 ≤ φ0, wd − t − v(ε00) ≤ wu.





[wd(e φ,ω) − wu(ω)] + v0(e ε)
ωφ(e φ, e ε)
ωe(e φ, e ε)
=
f(e φ)
1 − F(e φ)
[wd − ω] −
f(e φ)
F(e φ)
[ω(e φ,0) − wu] + v0(e ε)
ωφ(e φ, e ε)





(wd − wu) −
v0(e ε)
ωe(e φ, e ε)
=
F(Φ) − F(e φ)
1 − F(e φ)
−
v0(e ε)
ωe(e φ, e ε)
.
18A.4 FOC of the welfare maximization problem











v(εi)dF(φi) − [1 − F(e φ)]γ.
Accordingly, the derivatives of welfare with respect to t and ω are
∂W
∂ω










= [−ω + ω(e φ,0) + v(e ε) + γ]f(e φ(ω,t))e φt(ω,t).
At an interior optimum it must be that
∂W
∂t
= 0 → −ω + v(e ε) + ω(e φ,0) + γ = 0
which together with
wd − t − v(e ε) − wu = 0
imply
t∗ = γ + [wd − wu] − [ω∗ − ω(e φ(ω∗,t∗),0)].
Moreover, from ∂W
∂t = 0 we get











Lemma 1 If tuition fees are not allowed then
v0(˜ ε)
ωe(˜ φ, ˜ ε)
> 1.
Proof. Notice that a student exerting no eﬀort can not be marginal
(unless ˜ φ = φL) since her utility when achieving the degree, ˜ wd(˜ φ,ω), is
strictly greater than that if she does not attend school, wu(˜ φ). Consequently,
I only need to consider students who exert a strictly positive eﬀort to achieve
the degree.
The two following inequalities must hold with at least one of them being
strict (both expressions will hold simultaneously with equality only in the
case in which φH = φL).
˜ wd(˜ φ,ω) ≥ ω(˜ φ, ˜ ε)
and
ω(˜ φ,0) ≥ ˜ wu(˜ φ).
The ﬁrst of these inequalities implies that
˜ wd(˜ φ,ω) − v(˜ ε) ≥ ω(˜ φ, ˜ ε) − v(˜ ε) (14)
and the second that
ω(˜ φ,0) ≥ ˜ wu(˜ φ). (15)
Now let ˜ e∗ satisfy
v0(˜ e∗)
ωe(˜ φ, ˜ e∗)
= 1. (16)
Note that ˜ e∗ is the eﬀort level that and individual with ability ˜ φ would exert
in a frictionless labor market. Suppose that the marginal student needs to
exert an eﬀort level ˜ ε ≤ ˜ e∗ to achieve the standard. Since ω(φi,ei) − v(ei)
is concave and ˜ ε > 0, ˜ ε ≤ ˜ e∗ implies that
ω(˜ φ, ˜ ε) − v(˜ ε) > ω(˜ φ,0). (17)
Equations (14), (15) and (17) imply that (recall that either 14 or 15 must
be satisﬁed with strict inequality)
˜ wd(˜ φ,q,ω) − v(˜ ε) > ˜ wu(˜ φ).
20Which contradicts the fact that
˜ wd(˜ φ,ω) − v(˜ ε) = ˜ wu(˜ φ,ω).
Consequently equation (16) cannot hold.
Moreover, this also implies that the marginal student must exert an eﬀort
level ˜ ε > ˜ e∗. Thus,
v0(˜ ε)
ωe(˜ φ, ˜ ε,q)
> 1.
from the concavity of ω(φi,ei,q) − v(ei).
A.6 The optimal individual grading standard
The grading standard that maximizes the willingness to pay for attending
school by the marginal individual results from maximizing ∆(φi,ω) with





















where ωi denotes the optimal grading standard for an individual with ability
φi when she is the marginal individual. Assume that (19) is satisﬁed, then
the comparative static of ωi with respect to φi follows from diﬀerentiation






Then, ∂ωi/∂φi ≥ 0 if ∆ωφi(φi,ωi) ≥ 0. Suﬃcient conditions for ∆ωφi(φi,ωi) ≥
0 are that the hazard rate is increasing, ω concave in both arguments and
ωφe > 0.














































Since the right hand sides of equations (20) and (21) are the same, if (21)





















which is satisﬁed if the hazard rate is increasing, ωφe > 0 and ωφφ ≤ 0.
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